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Abstract 
People generally seek out positive moods and 
avoid negative moods; however, it is unclear 
which motivation is more pronounced.  Two 
studies addressed this issue by developing a value-
based ranking of emotions based on the 
willingness to pay (WTP) approach.  The 
approach utilizes money’s cardinal properties and 
assumes opportunity costs as with everyday 
purchases.  In Study 1 British participants 
indicated they would be willing to pay more to 
experience positive than to avoid negative 
emotions.  In Study 2 this positivity bias was 
replicated with another sample of British 
participants.  However, Hong Kong Chinese 
participants did not show such a preference, and 
were willing to pay significantly less to 
experience positive emotions but more to avoid 
negative emotions when compared with British 
participants.  Experiencing Love was given the 
highest WTP judgment in all samples.  Thus, 
some emotions are universally valued, whereas 
preferences for others differ across cultural groups, 
perhaps shaped by norms.  Implications 
concerning valuations of psychological states for 
policy purposes are discussed. 
Keywords: subjective well-being, emotion, affect, 
willingness-to-pay, culture, affective forecasting 
Aristotle argued that the accumulation of 
wealth is not an end in itself, but only a means to 
achieving the real end: Happiness (Aristotle, 350 
B.C./1998).  Psychological research supports this 
contention (Diener & Lucas, 2004).  For instance, 
people say they save money to achieve future 
emotional well-being (Canova, Rattazzi, & 
Webley, 2005).  We pay for a holiday to 
experience positive emotions such as joy and calm, 
and buy holiday insurance to avoid negative 
emotions such as worry and regret.  The aim of 
the current research was to examine just how 
much money people are willing to pay to 
experience different positive emotions and avoid 
negative ones.  For reasons developed below, we 
focus on direct emotional experiences unmediated 
by the purchase of goods and services usually 
associated with attempts to achieve or avoid 
emotional states.  In our opinion, the application 
of economic methods developed in the context of 
valuing different states of the world to valuing 
different emotional states can illuminate a number 
of significant issues regarding well-being.   
Although some research has explored the 
relative impact of actual experiences of positive 
and negative emotions on assessments of global 
well-being (e.g., Kuppens, Realo, & Diener, 2008; 
Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996), we know relatively 
little about which emotions people think will have 
the most influence, and as a consequence, they are 
more likely to pursue or avoid.  Kahneman (2000) 
refers to this distinction as one between 
experienced utility, namely the emotions actually 
experienced, and decision utility, namely the 
choices made on the basis of predicted emotional 
experiences.  This distinction is critical because 
there are often discrepancies between the intensity 
and duration of what people expect to feel, which 
influences their decisions and choices, and what 
they actually do feel once a choice has been made 
(Wilson & Gilbert, 2003).  In the current research 
we explore this issue by examining whether 
people are prepared to pay a premium for 
experiencing positive or avoiding negative 
emotions, and the degree to which such 
preferences are consistent with existing literature 
on the likely impact of differently valenced 
emotions on global well-being.   
The approach of putting a price tag on 
emotional experiences may also provide insight 
into cross-cultural differences regarding the 
desirability of emotional experiences.  Several 
studies have asked participants from different 
cultures about the degree to which positive and 
negative emotions are culturally acceptable, ideal, 
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and desirable.  Despite some within-culture 
heterogeneity, respondents in collectivist cultures 
tend to be more accepting of negative emotions 
than those in individualistic ones (Eid & Diener, 
2001; Sommers, 1984a; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 
2006).  More nuanced examinations of specific 
emotions, however, are restricted by the use of 
traditional Likert-type scales that fail to 
incorporate the kinds of trade-offs and opportunity 
costs involved in decision utility.  For instance, 
respondents could consider both fear and anger 
“very undesirable,” but this leaves unclear which 
emotion they would prefer to avoid if given a 
choice.   
 
The Contribution of Positive and Negative 
Emotions to Well-Being 
 Subjective well-being (SWB) is defined in 
terms of how people think and feel about their 
lives (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), and is 
considered high when positive thoughts and 
feelings outweigh negative ones, and low for the 
opposite pattern.  Kahneman and colleagues have 
argued that this approach to well-being has its 
origins in Utilitarian definitions of happiness and, 
as envisaged by these philosophers, could play an 
important role in improving policy-related 
resource allocation decisions (Dolan & Kahneman, 
2008; Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & 
Stone, 2004; Kahneman & Sugden, 2005).   
However, in the search for greater SWB is 
it better to pursue positive emotions or avoid 
negative ones?  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
are among those who argue that negative stimuli 
tend to influence us more than positive ones, and 
thus it makes sense to focus on reducing negative 
emotions (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, although see 
Schimmack, 2005).  Others recognize the unique 
contribution of positive emotions (e.g., 
Fredrickson, 2004), not least in terms of reducing 
morbidity and mortality (Cohen & Pressman, 
2006; Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001).  
Importantly, positive and negative emotions are 
not simply two ends of the same spectrum but 
constitute two related yet separate dimensions 
(Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1999), and are 
associated with different neural architectures in 
the brain (Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000).  
Thus, the relative importance of negatives and 
positives for overall well-being becomes an 
important issue.   
A number of studies by Diener and 
colleagues have investigated this question 
(Kuppens et al., 2008; Oishi, Diener, Choi, Kim-
Prieto, & Choi, 2007; Suh et al., 1996; Suh, 
Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998), but have yielded 
somewhat equivocal results.  Suh et al. (1996) 
asked US students to recount whether they had 
experienced a number of positive and negative life 
events (e.g. made a new friend vs. gained weight) 
within the previous 4 years.  Positive and negative 
events correlated equally strongly with current life 
satisfaction.  A follow-up study across 41 nations 
using the World Values Survey similarly found 
that both positive and negative affect showed 
comparable correlations with life satisfaction (Suh 
et al., 1998).  A second study with college 
students from 40 nations, however, indicated a 
stronger influence of positive than negative affect 
on life satisfaction (Suh et al., 1998).   
Oishi et al. (2007) extended this work and 
also examined the relationship between life 
satisfaction and daily positive and negative events 
across different cultures.  For European 
Americans each negative event had nearly twice 
the impact in satisfaction as each positive event, 
which contrasts with Suh and colleagues’ (1996) 
finding that positive and negative affect had 
roughly the same impact.  For Asian Americans 
and Koreans negative events had slightly more 
impact and for Japanese students they had the 
same impact as positive ones, more in line with 
Suh et al. (1996).  Thus, an important contribution 
of Oishi and colleagues (2007) is the recognition 
of cultural differences in the relative importance 
of negative and positive events and emotions for 
overall life satisfaction.   
Extending this work further, Kuppens et al. 
(2008) looked at life satisfaction data from nearly 
nine thousand people from 46 different countries.  
Averaging across all countries, and in contrast to 
Suh et al. (1996) and Suh et al. (1998, Study 1), 
but consistent with Suh et al. (1998, Study 2), they 
found that positive emotions had nearly twice the 
influence on life satisfaction as negative emotions.  
Again, however, and in line with Oishi et al. 
(2007), this overall effect was moderated by 
culture, such that negative emotions were more 
important in predicting life satisfaction in 
individualistic cultures like the US rather than 
collectivist cultures like China.   
 
Preferences and Norms for Emotion 
Experiences  
In addition to the actual contribution of 
different emotional experiences to people’s well-
being, “ideal affects” have been construed as 
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emotional goals that people strive for through 
their daily activities (Larsen, 2000; Tsai et al., 
2006).  Not surprisingly, most people report that 
their ideal emotional states are pleasant, rather 
than unpleasant (Augustine, Hemenover, Larsen, 
& Shulman, 2010; Kampfe & Mitte, 2009).  
Nevertheless, noteworthy moderating factors such 
as cultural background (Tsai et al., 2006), 
individual differences such as level of 
extraversion (Rusting & Larsen, 1995) and 
interpersonal goals (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, Fung, & 
Yeung, 2007) have been observed.  Discrepancies 
between these ideal emotional states and actual 
emotional states incur psychological cost such as 
depression (Tsai et al., 2006) and lowered life 
satisfaction (Kampfe & Mitte, 2009).  If we 
consider people’s actions as habitual attempts to 
regulate discrepancies between ideal and actual 
emotions, knowing which emotions people desire 
and value will help us understand why people 
engage in certain emotion-inducing behaviors but 
not others (Larsen, 2000; Kampfe & Mitte, 2009).   
Eid and Diener (2001) assessed 
participants’ desirability of four positive (affection, 
joy, pride, and contentment) and four negative 
(anger, fear, sadness, and guilt) emotions.  In the 
U.S., 83% percent of respondents rated all positive 
emotions as desirable and 44% rated all negative 
emotions as undesirable.  In China, by contrast, 
only 9% of respondents thought all positive 
emotions were desirable and only 14% thought 
that all negative emotions were undesirable.  Thus, 
whereas American participants generally saw 
positive emotions as desirable, and negative 
emotions as undesirable, Chinese participants 
preferred more of a balance of both.   
Eid and Diener (2001) further noted the 
rather homogeneous norm for Western 
participants to feel good (see also Sommers, 
1984b).  Other findings also support this notion of 
a cultural expectation of positive affect.  Sommers 
(1984b) showed that American participants 
considered positive feelings more typical to occur 
on a daily basis, both for themselves, and for the 
average person.  In addition, other people were 
rated as more likeable if they were thought to 
generally show more positive than negative affect.  
Further, although Asians tend to report fewer 
positive experiences than Western participants, 
this bias seems to be due to fewer recalled positive 
events, rather than fewer experienced events 
(Oishi, 2002; Wirtz, Chiu, Diener, & Oishi, 2009).  
Thus, it appears that Western participants are well 
aware of the “(…) pressure to be joyful, happy, 
and full of love and pride and to make use of their 
constitutional right to the pursuit of happiness” 
(Eid & Diener, 2001, p. 880), which might be 
reflected in their desired emotional states.   
 
Evaluating Emotional Preferences by Price-
Tags 
To date, ideal emotional states have been 
measured by scales asking participants how much 
they wish to feel or avoid certain positive 
emotions and negative emotions (e.g., Augustine 
et al., 2010; Kampfe & Mitte, 2009; Rusting & 
Larsen, 1985; Tsai et al., 2006).  However, it may 
also be beneficial to explore what people are 
prepared to do to achieve the most desirable 
emotions.  Are they willing to spend effort, time 
and even money to pursue them?   
 Economists have long studied individuals’ 
likes and dislikes through their revealed and stated 
preferences (e.g., Adamowicz, Louviere, & 
Williams, 1994).  Revealed preference 
operationalizes individuals’ preferences for 
options by looking at what they chose.  For 
example, by assessing which dress the consumer 
has purchased, we know which dress she prefers, 
and how valuable it is to her.  When goods are not 
openly traded in the market and preferences 
cannot be revealed though purchasing behavior, 
the alternative approach of stated preferences has 
been adopted (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & 
Grant, 1993).  For instance, people are asked how 
much money they would be willing to pay to 
experience some good (e.g. a park near their house) 
or how much compensation they would be willing 
to accept to have some bad imposed upon them 
(e.g. building on a nearby park).  Such stated 
preferences are strongly related to predicted 
satisfaction with specific interventions (Kahneman 
et al., 1993).   
As non-market goods, emotional 
experiences could be quantified using a similar 
strategy.  Compared to Likert scale ratings, WTP 
judgments offer the following advantages as a 
metric for evaluation.  First, the approach assumes 
opportunity costs behind purchases.  With limited 
money and time, every activity has a trade-off: By 
buying the sandwich, we forgo the opportunity to 
spend that sum on the pasta for lunch; by 
attending the lecture, we forgo the opportunity to 
spend time with friends.  When participants assign 
a price to an emotional experience, they have 
decided to forgo the opportunity to spend that 
amount of money on alternative purchases.  In 
contrast, Likert scales do not capture the trade-offs 
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between purchases that are implied in this pricing 
exercise.  Second, the use of monetary values to 
quantify emotional experience allows researchers 
to exploit the ratio property of money (i.e., USD 5 
is half of USD 10) and enables comparisons 
between emotional experiences with different 
ranks based on their means derived from Likert 
scales.  For instance, besides testing whether 
happiness is valued more highly than pride, we 
can quantify this preference.  The WTP approach 
may facilitate the study of emotional experience 
by making participants’ emotional experiences 
comparable with their daily consumption behavior, 
because the same metric is used for emotional 
experiences as for hourly wages, a family dinner, 
or a favorite pair of jeans.   
 
The Current Research 
 Our goal was to develop a value-based 
ranking of different emotions by having people 
assign hypothetical monetary values to time-
limited emotional states.  Building on the logic of 
using WTP estimates for valuations of non-market 
goods, participants were asked to state the amount 
they would be prepared to pay to experience a 
range of specific positive emotions (e.g. happiness, 
love) and avoid specific negative emotions (e.g. 
fear, anger) for a limited time.  Study 1 tested 
British participants.  In Study 2, we aimed to 
replicate the pattern of the value-based ranking of 
emotions of British participants obtained in Study 
1 using a more comprehensive repertoire of 
emotion items.  Moreover, because previous 
research (e.g., Tsai et al., 2006; Eid & Diener, 
2001) suggested that individualistic and 
collectivistic cultures differ in the emotional 
experiences they see as normative and desirable, 
we investigated how value-based rankings of 
emotions vary across cultural groups, and 
compared British students to Chinese students in 
Hong Kong.  Overall, the goal was to explore how 
people decide to spend one of their main limited 
resources, namely money, in order to maximize 
well-being and happiness.   
 
Study 1 
 This study investigated whether British 
participants are willing and able to differentiate 
between different emotional experiences via a 
WTP approach.  Given that people may find this 
exercise unusual we contextualized it by also 
asking how much they would be willing to pay to 
experience familiar positive and negative 
activities.   
 We deemed two outcomes possible.  On 
the one hand, based on the literature suggesting 
that negative emotions and events factor more 
heavily into people’s well-being (Oishi et al., 
2007), participants might prefer avoiding negative 
emotions over experiencing positive ones.  On the 
other hand, because experiencing positive affect in 
individualistic societies is highly normative (Eid 
& Diener, 2001; Sommers, 1984b), the opposite 
pattern might be obtained.  Indeed, Tsai, Knutson 
and Fung (2006) note that cultural norms 
influence ideal affect more strongly than actually 
experienced affect.  Thus, participants might 
follow the uniform norms identified by Eid and 
Diener (2001), which for individualistic cultures 
stipulate a strong expectation to experience 
positive emotions, such as happiness, love and 
pride.   
 
Method 
 Participants. Ninety-seven students (17 
male) from the University of Plymouth who 
identified “British” as their nationality 
participated in an unpaid online survey in 
response to email invitations sent via student 
email lists.   
 Materials and procedure. A survey was 
designed to measure participants’ WTP judgments 
for re-creating positive emotional experiences 
(love, happiness, and pride) or avoiding negative 
emotional experiences (anger, embarrassment, 
fear, disgust, loneliness, worry, guilt, regret, 
sadness, and nervousness).  Participants were 
asked to imagine that each emotional episode was 
of high intensity and would last for one hour.  
Prior to giving their WTP judgments, participants 
were asked to consider an episode of a specific 
emotional experience that included some of the 
appraisals (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) 
associated with a given emotion.  For happiness, 
for instance, participants were instructed:  
“Think of a specific time when you were 
very happy. This might have been because 
you felt very content with a specific 
situation in your life. Think of the feeling 
you experienced at the time. How much 
would you be willing to pay to re-create 
this feeling for one hour?” 
Participants then indicated a price between GBP 
10 and GBP 150, with GBP 10 increments.  
Additionally, participants were asked to assign 
prices to four events: Spending time with a person 
they care about, engaging in a favorite task, 
avoiding a person they dislike, and avoiding a 
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disliked task.  These experiences were also said to 
be one hour long and were answered on the same 
scale.  Data were collected via an online survey 
during Fall 2007.  Informed consent was sought 
prior to the start of the survey, and debriefing was 
provided upon completion.  The study was 
approved by the University of Plymouth’s School 
of Psychology Research Ethics Committee.   
Results 
Do people give different WTP 
judgments for different emotional experiences? 
We first tested whether people assigned different 
prices to experience positive emotions and avoid 
negative ones.  We aggregated WTP judgments 
for experiencing love, happiness, and pride to 
form a mean WTP score for positive emotions, 
and WTP for avoiding sadness, worry, guilt, 
embarrassment, loneliness, fear, regret, anger, 
nervousness, and disgust to form a mean WTP 
score for negative emotions.  Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics and the ranks of the thirteen 
individual emotions and valence aggregates.  
Means and standard deviations are in Pound 
Sterling.  A paired-samples t-test suggested that 
participants were willing to pay more to 
experience positive emotions than to avoid 
negative emotions, t(96) = 8.13, p < .001, d = .47.  
For individual emotions, experiencing love was 
ranked first, followed by happiness, and avoiding 
sadness and worry.   
Repeated contrasts suggested that the WTP 
of experiencing happiness was higher than for 
avoiding sadness, F(1, 88) = 6.42, p < .01 (and all 
subsequent emotions), that avoiding sadness was 
higher than avoiding worry, F(1, 88) = 5.09, p 
< .02 (and all subsequent emotions), and avoiding 
nervousness was higher than avoiding disgust, F(1, 
88) = 9.60, p < .003 (and all subsequent emotions).  
In other words, participants were keener to 
experience positive emotions than to avoid 
negative ones, as reflected in their WTP 
judgments.   
Does the positivity bias extend to more 
familiar scenarios? To ensure that the emotion-
related results were not simply a function of the 
unfamiliarity of the task we also evaluated 
participant’s WTP to engage in positive vs. 
negative activities, and spend time with liked vs. 
disliked persons using a 2 (Valence: Positive, 
Negative) x 2 (Type of experience: People, Task) 
repeated-measures ANOVA.  Participants gave 
higher WTP judgments for re-creating pleasant 
experiences, (Liked person: M = 99.89, SD = 
48.54; Favorite task: M = 51.05, SD = 41.53) than 
for avoiding unpleasant ones (Disliked person: M 
= 38.53, SD = 32.78, Disliked task: M = 26.95, SD 
= 27.83), F(1, 94) = 114.79, p < .001.  Spending 
time with people elicited higher WTP evaluations 
in general than activities, F(1, 94) = 94.23, p 
< .001 (means above), and the significant 
interaction between valence and type of 
experience, F(1, 94) = 33.29, p < .001, suggests 
that people elicited greater polarization in WTP 
evaluations for liked vs. disliked people than 
pleasant vs. unpleasant activities.  To summarize, 
the positive-negative asymmetry observed for 
emotional experiences extended to time spent with 
people and activities.   
 
Discussion 
 Study 1 was a first attempt to apply the 
WTP approach to understand people’s emotional 
preferences.  Results suggest that participants are 
willing and able to differentiate emotions through 
different WTP judgments to arrive at a ranking of 
emotional experiences.  Participants gave higher 
WTP judgments to experience positive emotions 
than to avoid negative ones.   
Our findings are consistent with earlier 
suggestions that in individualistic cultures it is 
highly normative to experience positive affect 
(e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001; Sommers, 1984b), and 
thus, our findings might reflect participants’ 
awareness that in their cultural context, pursuing 
positive affect is both normative and desirable.  
Ironically however, as noted by Oishi et al. (2007), 
in a culture that highly prizes positive affect, and 
where good moods are prevalent most of the time, 
a given negative event can be much more 
detrimental to overall life satisfaction (although 
see Kuppens et al., 2008, for different results).  In 
this sense, participants may be showing an error of 
affective forecasting (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003), 
because they do not recognize the actual benefit of 
avoiding negative emotions over positive 
emotions.   
Participants’ greater preference for 
experiencing positive than avoiding negative 
emotions extended to time spent on liked and 
disliked events and people, such that participants 
were willing to pay the most for time spent with 
their favorite person.  Indeed, the values assigned 
to an hour with a favorite person and an hour of 
experiencing love were almost identical (GBP 100 
vs. GBP 95), supporting our contention that the 
WTP method of valuing emotions was readily 
understood by participants.  Our pattern of 
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findings is in line with previous findings on the 
importance of love relative to other positive 
emotional experiences such as joy and pride 
across cultures (Sommers, 1984a), and the 
contribution of belongingness to psychological 
well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Deci & 
Ryan, 2000; Ryff, 1989).   
Despite this convergence our results 
differed from those of Eid and Diener (2001), who 
used a Likert scale approach.  First, whereas they 
found pride to be a highly valued emotion, our 
respondents were not willing to pay much to 
experience it compared to other positive emotions.  
One interpretation of this difference may be that 
people feel that pride is something you have to 
earn yourself and that cannot be bought, or else it 
becomes false pride. Another possibility is that the 
British may not see pride as a particularly 
desirable emotion.  Sommers (1984a), for instance, 
found that 47% of her (small) American sample 
thought pride was a constructive emotion but that 
only 33% of Greeks and 25% of Chinese did, 
suggesting wide cultural variation in reactions to 
this particular emotion.  Second, Eid and Diener 
(2001) found that sadness was viewed as more 
desirable than anger and fear.  This would suggest 
that people should be willing to pay less to avoid 
sadness, but we found the opposite, suggesting 
that people do want to avoid it.  The literature on 
psychological resilience highlights the benefits of 
some sadness and adversities in one’s growth 
(Seery, Holman, & Silver, 2010).  However, such 
benefits are usually not witnessed at the time a 
loss is incurred, and sadness due to loss is more 
intense and dreadful to endure, compared to other 
negative emotions such as anger (Reisenzein, 
1994).  It is therefore not hard to imagine that 
participants were willing to pay generously to 
sidestep the dolorous experience when asked to 
imagine encountering sadness in our WTP 
paradigm, but agreed that the experience is 
appropriate or even desirable in a preference 
paradigm such as Eid and Diener’s (2001).   
Encouraging as the results are, the 
positivity bias we observed may be attributed to 
the unequal salience of the positive and negative 
emotion items we used.  Although we attempted 
to control the intensity of emotions by stating that 
each emotional experience would last for one hour 
of high intensity, we had only three positive, but 
ten negative emotions, and thus the findings may 
be due to this difference.  Study 2, therefore, used 
equal numbers of positive and negative emotions.   
 
Study 2 
Study 2 extended Study 1 in a number of 
ways.  A limitation of research comparing the 
relative importance of positive vs. negative 
emotions is that it does not tell us which specific 
emotions are best (or worst) for overall well-being.  
Many authors argue that a simple focus on valence 
can obscure important differences across specific 
emotions.  For instance, appraisal theorists (e.g., 
Ortony et al., 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 
1990; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001) 
presume that specific emotions are the result of 
cognitive interpretations of emotion-eliciting 
stimuli that produce adaptive responses.  Thus, 
although happiness is considered a positive 
emotion, and anger a negative emotion, both 
involve approach tendencies and can lead to the 
same effects on cognitive processing 
(Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994), 
presumably because happiness and anger both 
imply that one can trust one’s own inclinations 
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).  In terms of overall 
well-being we might therefore expect that people 
prefer to experience anger over other negative 
emotions, such as sadness or fear, and this is 
indeed what we found in Study 1.  A similar logic 
might be applied to other pairs of negative or 
positive emotions that despite the same valence 
involve different appraisals and action tendencies.   
Another aspect of emotion we take into 
account in the second study is arousal level.   
According to the circumplex model of emotion 
(Russell, 1980), some emotions involve high 
arousal (e.g., excitement, enthusiasm), whereas 
others involve lower arousal (e.g., calm, boredom), 
and this study had more examples of each kind.   
In Study 1 we had observed a general 
preference for positive emotions in British 
participants.  Because Asians take into account 
both recalled positive and negative emotional 
moments when judging the desirability of life 
situations such as vacations (Wirtz et al., 2009), 
we predicted that such a positivity bias would be 
absent among Hong Kong Chinese participants.  
Further, Lee, Aaker and Gardner (2000) postulate 
that collectivism is closely tied to a prevention-
oriented regulatory focus, and thus, Hong Kong 
Chinese participants may be willing to pay to 
prevent negative emotions compared to 
experiencing positive ones.   
To help anticipate possible findings 
regarding specific emotions, we were once again 
guided by Eid and Diener (2001).  Their 
respondents across cultures did not differ 
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regarding the importance of affection, joy and 
contentment.  However, collectivistic cultures 
perceived pride as more undesirable than their 
individualistic counterparts.  The 
inappropriateness of pride resonates with the 
primacy of maintaining group harmony in 
collectivistic people’s daily lives.  Following a 
similar logic, we predicted that compared to 
British participants, Hong Kong Chinese 
participants would value the presence of happiness 
and pride less, but the absence of embarrassment 
more.   
 
Methods 
 Participants. Eighty-seven participants 
were recruited via email invitations dispatched 
across student forums and university-wide email 
systems.  Roughly half (n = 41) were from the 
University of Cambridge and identified 
themselves as British (14 male, mean age = 22.27), 
whereas the remainder (n = 46; 21 male, mean age 
= 21.13) were from the Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology and identified themselves 
as Hong Kong Chinese.  Because Hong Kong 
Chinese undergraduates are brought up in a multi-
cultural, bilingual society with a strong English 
language heritage and must pass a public 
examination on academic English before entering 
university, an English questionnaire was 
employed among both Hong Kong Chinese and 
British undergraduates. This provided us with the 
opportunity to present the questionnaire to 
different cultural groups in exactly the same 
language.  Advantages of this included linguistic 
continuity and lack of translation/interpretation 
issues.   
Materials and procedure. As in Study 1, 
the survey measured participants’ WTP judgments 
for experiencing positive emotions or avoiding 
negative emotions that were specified to be of 
high intensity and to last for one hour.  Positive 
emotions included love, pride, happiness, delight, 
excitement, calm and enthusiasm, and negative 
emotions included sadness, regret, embarrassment, 
frustration, fear, anger and boredom.  British 
participants indicated a price between GBP 10 
pounds to GBP 150, with GBP 10 increments, 
whereas Hong Kong Chinese participants 
indicated a price between HKD 100 to HKD 1,500, 
with HKD 100 increments.
1  
 
Data were collected from an internet 
survey server during Fall 2009.  Informed consent 
was sought prior to the start of the survey, and 
debriefing was dispatched upon completion.  The 
study was approved by the University of 
Cambridge’s Social and Developmental 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee.   
Results 
 Replicating study 1. We first tested 
whether the positivity bias obtained in Study 1 
was replicated in the current sample of British 
undergraduates.  The judgments for the seven 
positive emotions and seven negative ones were 
averaged to form mean WTP judgments for 
positive and negative emotions respectively 
(Table 2
2
).  A paired-samples t-test suggested that 
the mean WTP for positive emotions was higher 
than that for avoiding negative emotions, t(40) = 
2.15, p < .04, d = .22.  This pattern replicates 
Study 1 but the effect size now, with equal 
numbers of positive and negative emotions, was 
smaller.  For the eight emotions that were assessed 
in both studies (love, sadness, happiness, 
embarrassment, regret, pride, anger, and fear), the 
rank order was largely replicated: Love was given 
the highest value, followed by happiness, sadness, 
fear, embarrassment, regret, pride and anger.  The 
differences were that embarrassment and regret 
were above fear in Study 1, but just below it in 
Study 2, and whereas pride was below anger in 
Study 1, the order was reversed in Study 2.  This 
general replication of the value-based ranking of 
emotions and the positivity bias suggests that the 
WTP approach may be a robust method of 
capturing emotion preferences.   
 Do British and Hong Kong Chinese 
participants differ in their willingness to pay 
for different emotions? A paired-samples t-test 
was used to compare the mean WTP for positive 
and negative emotions among Hong Kong 
Chinese participants.  This time there was no 
significant difference, t(45) = 1.14, p = .26, d 
= .12.  Nevertheless, like British participants, 
Hong Kong Chinese participants were willing to 
pay most for an hour of love and least to avoid an 
hour of boredom (Table 2).  The rank orders for 
the emotions between these extremes were quite 
different across cultures.  For instance, although 
happiness was ranked second among the British 
sample, it was ranked only 8th among Hong Kong 
Chinese, and the latter ranked regret 2nd, whereas 
British participants ranked it 7th.   
 To facilitate cross-cultural comparisons we 
computed mean-centered scores for each emotion 
within each sample using raw scale responses (i.e., 
1-15 rather than the currency amounts).  These 
country-specific mean-centered scores were 
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submitted to a 2 (Culture: British, Hong Kong 
Chinese) by 14 (Emotions: Love, Happiness, 
Sadness, Delight, Fear, Embarrassment, Regret, 
Pride, Excitement, Calm, Anger, Frustration, 
Enthusiasm, Boredom) multivariate ANOVA.  As 
predicted, WTP judgments were not equivalent for 
all emotions across cultures, V = .412, F(13, 73) = 
3.93, p < .001 Pillai’s trace.  To explore which 
emotions British and Hong Kong Chinese 
participants differed on, we referred to the 
univariate outputs from the MANOVA (Table 3).  
The positive emotions of happiness, delight and 
calm all received higher relative WTP offers 
among British than Hong Kong Chinese 
participants.  The opposite was the case for the 
negative emotions of embarrassment, regret and 
frustration.  No other emotions differed 
significantly across samples.   
To examine this apparent difference in 
WTP for positive versus negative emotions we 
collapsed the mean-centered scores for all positive 
and negative emotions and conducted a 2 (Culture: 
British, Hong Kong Chinese) by 2 (Valence: 
positive, negative) mixed-factorial ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the second factor.  There 
was no main effect of Culture because the scores 
were identical due to the within country mean-
centering, and no main effect of valence, F(1, 85) 
= .31, p < .58.  However, there was a significant 
interaction, F(1, 85) = 5.05, p < .03.  Controlling 
for overall tendencies within country, follow-up 
independent t-tests found that British participants 
were willing to pay significantly more (M = .33) 
than Hong Kong Chinese (M = -.20) to experience 
positive emotions, t(85) = 2.25, p < .027, d = .49, 
but significantly less to avoid negative emotions, 
Ms = -.33; .20, t(85) = 2.25, p < .027, d = .49.   
 
Discussion 
Study 2 largely replicated the value-based 
ranking of emotions and the positivity bias on 
WTP judgments obtained in Study 1 in another 
group of British undergraduates using a greater 
repertoire of emotion items.  The study also 
demonstrated differences in evaluation of 
emotions across members of different cultural 
groups by exploring the WTP judgments of Hong 
Kong Chinese undergraduates.   
Participants from both groups were willing 
to spend most on experiencing love (see also 
Sommers, 1984a), consistent with the notion of a 
strong need to establish and sustain caring social 
ties (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).  Interestingly, 
both Chinese and British participants were not 
willing to pay much to experience pride compared 
to other emotional experiences, which is in line 
with the universal hesitancy to express pride 
found by Sommers (1984a).   
Consistent with the findings of Eid and 
Diener (2001), cross-cultural comparisons of 
emotions suggested that British participants were 
willing to pay more to experience positive 
emotions and avoid negative ones than Hong 
Kong Chinese participants.  When controlling for 
each culture’s tendency to consistently pay more 
(or less) for emotions, significant cross-cultural 
differences in WTP judgments were found in six 
out of fourteen items, and two additional items 
showed marginally significant differences.  British 
participants were willing to pay significantly more 
than their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts for 
experiencing pleasant emotions such as happiness, 
delight, and calm, whereas Hong Kong 
participants were willing to pay significantly more 
to avoid the unpleasant emotions of regret, 
embarrassment and frustration.  Unlike their 
British counterparts Hong King Chinese 
participants did not show a preference for 
experiencing positive over avoiding experiences 
of negative emotions, consistent with findings that 
they take both into account when evaluating 
experiences (Wirtz et al., 2009).  Results are also 
consistent with differences in self-regulatory focus 
of the two cultures (Lee et al., 2000), with British 
participants exhibiting a more approach-oriented 
regulatory focus for positive emotions and Hong 
Kong Chinese participants exhibiting a more 
avoidance-oriented regulatory focus.  For instance, 
the finding that Hong Kong Chinese were 
prepared to pay more than British participants in 
mitigating embarrassment is consistent with the 
functional importance of aversive self-conscious 
emotions in upholding social norms among 
members of collectivistic cultures (Tangney, 
1999).  Thus, beneath the global patterns of 
positive-negative emotions we observed a more 
nuanced pattern of specific emotions that are more 
or less valued in different cultures.   
 
General Discussion 
Emotions are embedded in the goods and 
services we consume daily.  We pay to have fun at 
the fairground and avoid frustration by recruiting 
someone to help complete tax returns. The current 
research attempted to quantify the value that 
people put on different emotions unmediated by 
the goods and services they purchase.  In Study 1 
British participants indicated how much they 
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would be willing to pay to experience positive, 
and avoid negative, emotions.  Study 2 examined 
the robustness of the approach across a broader 
range of emotions and explored potential cultural 
differences in these valuations between British 
and Hong Kong Chinese students.   
Consistent with previous research, 
participants were willing to pay most to 
experience the feeling of love, reflecting a broadly 
held belief that satisfactory interpersonal 
relationships are a key component of happiness 
(e.g., Furnham, & Cheng, 2000; Lee, Park, 
Uhlemann, & Patsult, 2000; Ryff, 1989).  Our 
WTP approach also highlighted cross-cultural 
differences: British participants prized 
experiencing positive emotions over avoiding 
unpleasant emotions, whereas Hong Kong 
Chinese participants demonstrated no such 
difference.  This divergence is consistent with 
differences in prevalent self-regulatory focus of 
the two cultures (Lee at al., 2000).  Taken together 
the current studies showed that participants are 
able to use a WTP approach to differentiate their 
preference for emotions and that culture plays a 
predictable role in this process.   
 
Emotion Preferences, Cultural Norms and 
Affective Forecasting 
 We observed a clear pattern of emotional 
preferences that was moderated by cultural factors: 
British participants showed a strong preference to 
experience positive emotions, whereas Hong 
Kong Chinese participants showed an equal 
preference for experiencing positive emotions and 
avoiding negative emotions.  To what extent 
might such preferences be adaptive?  If we 
consider whether participants are engaging in an 
affective forecasting error, it needs to be clear 
whether it would objectively be better for overall 
life satisfaction to experience positive events and 
emotions, but not negative events and emotions.  
Unfortunately, the literature so far has resulted in 
somewhat contradictory conclusions, with some 
studies finding that both types of emotion 
influenced well-being equally (Suh et al., 1996; 
Suh et al., 1998, Study 1), other studies suggesting 
a greater influence of positive factors (Suh et al., 
1998, Study 2; Kuppens et al., 2008), and yet 
others suggesting a more pronounced impact of 
negative factors (Oishi et al., 2007).   
Further, rather than looking at the 
frequency of positive and negative emotions 
separately, some have proposed to look at the 
relative ratio of the two, conceptualized as 
hedonic balance (Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, 
Oishi, Dzokoto, & Ahadi, 2002), and cultures 
differ in the extent to which they consider it 
possible to experience both types of emotions at 
the same time (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 
2002).  Given the complexity of the issue, it is at 
present difficult to say whether participants’ WTP 
judgments are adaptive in accurately predicting 
which emotions might be important to pursue.  
What is clear, however, is that these preferences 
are strongly shaped by cultural norms.   
 Our findings are in line with earlier work 
suggesting that people have an implicit 
understanding of what emotions they are expected 
to feel; in Western cultures, this involves coming 
across as outgoing, happy and confident, whereas 
in Eastern cultures negative emotions such as guilt 
and shame are more normative (Eid & Diener, 
2001; Sommers, 1984a).  Perhaps due to this 
focus on positive affect in individualistic cultures, 
and the propensity to notice and recall them 
proficiently (Oishi, 2002; Wirtz, et al., 2009), 
these are also the emotions that come to mind 
when thinking of the ideal case scenario.  Indeed, 
Robinson and Clore (2002a) showed that when 
reporting on emotional experiences, people can 
either base their recollection on episodic memory, 
that is, examples of recent occurrences, or on 
semantic memory, namely general knowledge 
structures and beliefs.  When questioned regarding 
longer time frames, or how they feel in general, 
people are more likely to rely on beliefs rather 
than on specific examples of emotional 
experiences.  Our paradigm involved indicating 
the desirability of emotions in the abstract, and 
giving a global rather than contextualized 
judgment.  Thus, Robinson and Clore’s (2002b) 
accessibility model would predict that for such 
general judgments people should draw on beliefs, 
norms and expectations, which is precisely what 
we found for both countries.   
 
The Utility of the Willingness to Pay Approach 
The studies in this paper are only a first 
step in exploring how the WTP approach might 
aid our understanding of people’s valuations of 
emotions.  It is encouraging that responses 
complement earlier findings, but what added value 
does this approach offer over existing methods?  
We see at least two potential advantages, a 
theoretical one, and a practical one.   
First, the WTP approach encourages 
people to think of emotions in terms of what they 
have to forego in order to experience or avoid 
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them.  Because money is a scarce resource for 
most people it constitutes a familiar unit by which 
to make trade-offs.  The adoption of the WTP 
approach is therefore theoretically important 
because it is a closer approximation of the actual 
choices that people make in search of happiness in 
everyday life, compared to the responses given on 
the somewhat ambiguous response scales 
provided on Likert scales.   
Second, the WTP approach may help 
applied efforts to understand the value of non-
market goods.  A good example is the UK's 
National Ecosystem Assessment (UK NEA, 2011, 
see also Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).  
The aim of ecosystem service assessments is to 
help policy makers understand the value of the 
natural environment regarding otherwise costly 
services.  For instance, one way of understanding 
the importance of insects for pollinating crops is 
to derive a monetary estimate of what it would 
cost to pay someone to pollinate them by hand (i.e. 
the opportunity cost).  Importantly, the UK NEA 
also argues that one of the potential services 
offered by natural environments is emotion 
regulation, because they can help combat negative 
emotions and enhance positive ones (UK NEA, 
2011, Chp. 23).  Although a growing body of 
work supports this claim (e.g. Maas et al., 2009; 
Mitchell & Popham, 2008) it remains unclear how 
objectively “valuable” this function is.  We 
suggest that the WTP approach offers a potential 
way of measuring these benefits.  These values 
could then feed into habitat protection decisions 
alongside other ecosystem services.  
 
Issues and Limitations 
 Both the methodology of the current 
studies and the general approach may raise a 
number of potential issues.  First, we used small 
convenience samples of students and are not 
suggesting that the values we present here are 
representative of those that might be expressed 
within these populations as a whole, especially 
given the small to medium effect sizes.  The 
purpose of the current research was simply to 
explore whether respondents could use the 
measures by comparing whether their answers 
were consistent with those elicited via alternative 
methods in earlier research.  As such, this was a 
test case, and further research will need to develop 
the technique and examine its potential for use 
with larger sample sizes, participants with 
different demographic characteristics (e.g., in 
terms of age groups and socio-economic statuses), 
and in different contexts.   
Second, we presume cultural differences 
regarding independent or interdependent self-
construals in Study 2, but did not assess them 
directly.  Doing so would allow testing the 
mechanism behind the differences in WTP 
judgments of Hong Kong Chinese and British 
participants, and once established, cultural 
influences on emotional preference could 
illuminate their functions, and how people set 
emotional goals.   
Third, although using the same language 
for the questionnaire with both English and Hong 
Kong students in Study 2 provided several 
advantages (e.g. linguistic continuity and lack of 
translation issues) we recognize that this may have 
masked some differences.  Recent research 
suggests, for instance, that multicultural 
participants may employ different theories of 
subjective well-being when primed with different 
cultural mindsets, and that language can exert 
such a priming effect (Tam, Lau, & Jiang, 2012).  
If true of the current findings it would suggest a 
conservative estimate of cross-cultural differences 
and thus use of mother tongue (or first language) 
questionnaires may have shown stronger effects.  
We therefore recognize the importance of using 
mother tongue questionnaires in future while also 
acknowledging the unique opportunity the current 
samples offered in terms of questionnaire 
standardization.   
 In terms of more theoretical issues, 
extensive discussions of the limitations of the 
WTP approach already exist (Bateman et al., 
2002).  For present purposes we highlight four 
potential challenges for future research using a 
WTP approach to value emotions.  First, 
psychologists have discussed the idea of “taboo 
tradeoff”, i.e. the notion that emotions may be 
sacred and should not to be contaminated by 
secular money (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997).  
Consequently, it might be possible that 
participants refuse to differentiate their preference 
for emotions via price-tags.  Although possible, 
our findings did not suggest such a problem, but 
we recognize that these issues may become more 
important for other populations or in other 
contexts.   
Second, rather than reflecting the 
importance of specific emotions, a willingness to 
pay approach may be picking up difficulties in 
perceived emotion regulation.  A person who has 
trouble controlling their own anger, for instance, 
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may be willing to pay more to avoid being angry 
than someone who is more in control of this 
emotion.  Along similar lines individuals may be 
willing to pay more for emotions they experience 
rarely (i.e., a scarcity effect) and/or less for 
emotions they experience often (i.e., a satiation 
effect).  Thus, future research needs to examine 
the extent to which participants might use the 
WTP approach as a way of expressing relative 
emotional importance in general rather than 
idiosyncratic emotional goals.   
Third, there may be an essential 
asymmetry between experiencing positive 
emotions, which people interpret as also reflecting 
the absence of negative emotions, and avoiding 
negative emotions, which could imply neutrality 
rather than the presence of positive emotions.  
Thus, higher WTP estimates for positive emotions 
may reflect a belief in a double benefit.  Although 
possible, this does not explain why Hong Kong 
Chinese participants did not show the same 
positivity bias as UK participants, or why the 
latter were willing to pay substantially more to 
avoid negative emotions such as sadness and fear 
than positive emotions such as pride or excitement.  
Nevertheless, a more direct exploration of 
people’s underlying assumptions using a WTP 
paradigm is warranted.   
Finally, our instructions did not specify 
how participants should achieve or avoid the 
emotional experiences through their WTP 
estimates.  It was also uncertain, for instance, 
whether the WTP estimate of avoiding an emotion 
refers to paying to undo the negative 
consequences of an event (e.g., paying a parking 
fine quickly before the cost rises), paying to 
mollify distress (e.g., buying a drink because one 
is angry about being fined), or paying to sidestep 
the event altogether (e.g., paying for a taxi and 
avoid being fined).  Similar uncertainty exists for 
positive emotions.  Thus, future studies may be 
fine-tuned to be more sensitive to participants’ 
different stages of mood regulation (Gross, 2001), 
and compare their different attempts to experience 
and avoiding emotions accordingly.   
 
Conclusions 
We developed a novel WTP approach of 
estimating preferences for emotional experiences 
across cultures.  Because such an approach 
assumes opportunity costs associated with each 
preference and makes use of cardinal properties of 
money, resulting rank orders may capture 
preferences more closely than traditional Likert 
scales.  Further, the WTP paradigm provides an 
ecologically valid measure to assess emotions 
because the same unit is used as for other 
consumption behaviors occurring in daily life.  
Our data suggest that participants intuitively 
understood the logic behind this approach and had 
no difficulty in applying it to their own context.  
Thus, by putting price-tags on emotions we might 
come closer to understanding the value of human 
experience in order to aid policies aimed at 
enhancing well-being.    
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Footnotes 
1
 Purchasing power parity factors of GBP and HKD were 
taken into consideration in creating equivalent scales.  
Purchasing power parity indicates the amount of a certain 
currency required to purchase USD 1 worth of goods in a 
given country, and thus allows currency conversions that 
eliminate national differences in price levels (United 
Nations Statistics Division, 2009).  At the time of the 
survey, GBP 1 equated HKD 11.8. However, for ease of 
administration of the survey, we converted GBP 1 to 
HKD 10 when designing the scale.   
2
 Unexpectedly, WTP judgments of British participants in 
Study 2 were lower on average than those in Study 1 
despite the similar rank-orders of emotions.  This may be 
due to the worsening economic outlook over the course 
of data collection (2007 Study 1; 2009 Study 2).  
Although this is speculative, participants might have 
implemented a tighter budget in many aspects of their 
lives, and generalized this conservative budget to their 
WTP judgments for emotions.   
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Table 1 
Study 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Willingness to Pay Judgments for Different Emotional 
Experiences (Ranked From Highest to Lowest).  
Emotional experiences Mean WTP (in GBP)  SD 
Love 95.26 50.00 
Happiness 89.05  47.74 
Sadness 81.58  51.43 
Worry 68.97  48.06 
Guilt 66.15  44.52 
Embarrassment 63.40  43.37 
Loneliness 63.40  46.97 
Regret 62.37 46.43 
Fear 61.68 40.96 
Anger 59.28 46.55 
Pride 59.18 46.41 
Nervousness 59.17  46.87 
Disgust 43.20  35.25 
Mean positive 81.05  42.97 
Mean negative  62.84  34.91 
Note. Positive emotions = WTP to Re-Create; Negative Emotions = WTP to Avoid. 
  
Table 2 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Willingness to Pay Judgments for Emotional Experiences 
Among British and Hong Kong Chinese Participants (Ranked From Highest to Lowest in the UK).  
 British WTP (in GBP)  Hong Kong Chinese WTP         
(in HKD)  
 
 M SD Rank Study 1 Rank M  SD Rank 
Love 71.95  50.65 1  1 880.44 501.83 1 
Happiness 60.49  49.84 2 2 613.04 410.75 8 
Sadness 54.15 46.31 3 3 719.57 452.95 4 
Delight 51.71  45.66 4  532.61 395.56 10 
Fear 51.22 47.97 5 9 645.65 433.95 7 
Embarrassment 44.88  38.41 6 6 773.91 485.54 3 
Regret 40.24  40.09 7 8 823.91 527.12 2 
Pride 38.78  30.84 8 11 652.17 459.83 6 
Excitement 38.05  35.09 9  486.96 376.89 11 
Calm 33.41  32.99 10  343.48 290.33 13 
Anger 32.68  35.22 11 10 413.04 363.08 12 
Frustration 32.44  25.38 12  663.04 459.64 5 
Enthusiasm 26.58  21.63 13  536.96 437.85 9 
Boredom 19.76  21.27 14  282.61 280.72 14 
Mean positive 45.85  30.63   577.95 332.27  
Mean negative  39.34  27.55   617.39 320.81  
Note. Positive emotions = WTP to Re-Create; Negative Emotions = WTP to Avoid.  
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Table 3 
Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Mean-Centered Willingness to Pay Judgments (from 1-15) 
Among British and Hong Kong Chinese Participants (Ranked From Highest to Lowest in the UK).  
 British  Hong Kong Chinese Difference between Samples  
 M  SD M  SD     F (1,85)         p  
Love 2.94 3.14 2.83 3.25 0.03 .876 
Happiness 1.79  3.03 0.15 2.26 8.23 .005 
Sadness 1.16 2.93 1.22 3.42 0.01 .926 
Delight 0.91 2.58 -0.65 2.23 9.18 .003 
Fear 0.86 3.92 0.48 3.24 0.25 .620 
Embarrassment 0.23 2.47 1.76 3.26 6.00 .016 
Regret -0.24 2.62 2.26 3.77 12.57 .001 
Pride -0.38 2.10 0.55 2.65 3.20 .077 
Excitement -0.45 2.53 -1.11 2.94 1.21 .273 
Calm -0.92 2.96 -2.54 2.61 7.39 .008 
Anger -0.99 2.04 -1.85 2.81 2.59 .112 
Frustration -1.02 1.88 0.65 3.02 9.28 .003 
Enthusiasm -1.60 2.08 -0.61 3.15 2.94 .090 
Boredom -2.28 2.74 -3.15 2.53 2.35 .129 
Mean positive
a
 .33  .97 -.20 1.18 5.05 .027 
Mean negative  -.33  .97 .20 1.18 5.05 .027 
Note. Positive emotions = WTP to Re-Create; Negative Emotions = WTP to Avoid.  
 
